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ABSTRACT 
The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement constitutes a U.S. vision for a 
transnational world information order. The goal is to integrate culture 
and communication into a global electronic services sector managed by 
transnational business. The m A  vision contains significant implica- 
tions for Canadian and European communication policy. 
L'accord de libre-kchange canado-amkricain constitue une vision 
arnkricaine d'un ordre international de l'information transnational. 
L'objectif est d'intkgrer la culture et la communication en un secteur 
international des services Clectronique gkr6 par le commerce transna- 
tional. L'accord de libre-khange est lourd de cons6quences pour la 
rkglementation des communication au Canada et en Europe. 
A NEW ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION FOR NORTH AMERICA 
On 1 January 1989, the governments of Canada (1987a) and the United States 
put into practice North America's first free trade agreement F A ) .  As Warnock 
(1988:9) notes, the then President Reagan recognized the broad significance of 
the deal by hailing it as "a new economic constitution for North America." 
Though he opposed the agreement, the Attorney General of Ontario agreed with 
Reagan's assessment, arguing that: 
Like a constitution, the scope of the agreement is all embracing. It 
touches on virtually all aspects of governmental activity .... The agree- 
ment imposes new constraints on what Canadian governments can do 
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for people in the future, and the erosion of our ability to govern oursel- 
ves will be difficult to reverse (Cameron, 1988: 241). 
This article examines what makes the Free Trade Agreement a new con- 
stitution for North America. In doing so, it identifies how the Agreement 
promotes major changes in both Canadian political culture and in its political 
institutions. Notwithstanding the claims of those like Crisp (1988). who see the 
agreement as a simple treaty to eliminate tariffs, one can argue that the FTA is a 
constitutional document because the Agreement deepens and extends the post- 
World War I1 process of reconstituting the Canadian cultural and political 
landscape. 
Moreover, as Patrick (1989) has argued, the significance of the agreement 
extends beyond the realm of Canada-U.S. relations because it serves as a model 
that the U.S. is offering to the world as its way of forging and managing the 
global economy. Steps are now being taken to integrate Mexico into what 
would become a North American Free Trade Area. Moreover, the U.S. and 
Canadian governments are pressing the global trade organization GATT to in- 
corporate the FTA's unique provisions to open free trade in services. These 
would eliminate many of the supports that governments in Europe, Latin 
America, and elsewhere have relied on to implement national communication 
and information policies. 
The FTA therefore is a significant document in international communica- 
tions policy because its provisions constitute the foundation for a U.S. version 
of what is, in essence, a "New" New World Information and Communication 
Order. Unlike the New World Order led by Third World nations, which Mc- 
Phail (1987) has documented, this one would secure private business control 
over the production and distribution of culture and communication. The aim is 
to integrate culture and communication into a global electronic services sector 
managed by transnational business. 
CHANGING THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF CANADA 
The Free Trade Agreement was the subject of a fierce political debate in 
Canada. In the fall of 1989 it became the major issue in a bitterly fought nation- 
al election campaign. Much of the ferocity grew from the concern that the 
Agreement would accelerate the demise of Canada's already fragile cultural in- 
dusmes. Already overwhelmed with American magazines, movies, and 
television programs, Canadians, feared the critics like Crean (1988), would lose 
those last remaining policy protections in the industry central to maintaining na- 
tional sovereignty. The so-called Great Trade Debate was bound up with the 
question: Does the deal affect Canadian cultural industries? 
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This is an important question and it receives some treatment below. How- 
ever, before addressing the question of cultural industries, it is necessary to ex- 
amine the broader cultural significance of the Agreement. The FTA is more 
than a treaty that arguably applies to cultural industries. Its provisions promote 
major changes in Canadian political culture, particularly by advancing the 
process of harmonizing Canada's political values with the neo-Conservative 
agenda of the Reagan-Bush era. In essence, the agreement is not just about cul- 
ture, it is culture. Specifically, the FTA is arguably the most significant cultural 
product, among the many, that the U.S. has shipped across the border since it 
replaced Britain as Canada's principle trading partner. 
The FTA's "Objectives and Scope," its treatment of culture, and its use of 
the term "monopoly" provide concrete evidence from the text of the agreement 
that demonstrates its cultural significance. 
"Article 102: Objectives and Scope" describes what amounts to a Bill of 
Rights for Transnational Business. The five objectives of the FTA include: 
eliminating barriers to goods and services trade, facilitating fair competition, 
liberalizing investment within the trade area, establishing effective joint ad- 
ministrative procedures, and laying a foundation to expand the agreement for 
future bilateral and multilateral arrangements. 
The second of this two-page "Objectives and Scope" section strengthens 
these economistic goals by giving them precedence over principles contained in 
other agreements and over the wishes of states, provinces, and local govern- 
ments. According to Article 104, "In the event of any inconsistency between the 
provisions of this Agreement and such other agreements, the provisions of this 
Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, except as otherwise 
provided in the Agreement." In other words, a Bill of Rights for Transnational 
Business has become the chief defining document for North America. 
Moreover, Article 103.binds the Parties "to ensure that all necessary measures 
(defined as "any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice") are taken 
in order to give effect to its provisions, including their observance, except as 
otherwise provided in this Agreement, by state, provincial and local govern- 
ments." 
The U.S. political culture is centralist so that state involvement in national 
policy is minimal. Consequently, most Americans would not expect that state or 
local governments would be directly involved in the national trade policy 
process. This is not the case, however, for Canada, where provincial power is 
embedded in its federalist system. Though specific governments have realized 
these tendencies in different ways, this provision places U.S. political values in 
the forefront of the FTA, not as an assertion of national governmental authority 
but rather to establish the precedence of continental governance over national, 
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regional or local power where the latter conflict with the continentalist objec- 
tives of the agreement. 
The FTA goes even further by redefining the very concept of culture to be a 
marketable commodity. Moreover, it does so in the very section that ostensibly 
protects cultural industries. Supporters of the Agreement cite Article 2005 (1): 
"Cultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this Agreement." But just 
one clause down in Article 2005 (2), the Agreement qualifies the exemption by ! 
permitting a Party to take "measures of equivalent commercial effect in I 
response to actions that would have been inconsistent with this Agreement." In 
other words, if one Party believes that the other is unfairly subsidizing an in- 
dustry, including culture, it can retaliate by raising duties in some other area. 
Rather than exempt culture, the FTA makes it a specific target of retaliation. 
More importantly, by including culture in a section that permits retaliation to 
equivalent commercial effect, as Cameron (1988: xvi) observes, "Canada has 
accepted the American definition of culture: a commodity to be bought and sold 
for profit." If you agree to permit commercial retaliation against cultural sub- 
sidies, then you have agreed to define culture as a commodity. Another 
prominent feature of American capitalism has entered the founding document of 
continentalism. 
Finally, the FTA accepts the American cultural redefinition of a Canadian 
crown corporation by replacing the latter with the American term of op- 
probrium, the monopoly. As the government of Canada (1987~) has acknow- 
ledged, Canada has built its communications system on a foundation of crown 
corporations or public enterprises empowered to advance national or provincial 
goals. At the national level, the CBC, the National Film Board, Telefilm 
Canada, and others have promoted Canadian cultural expressions that extend 
well beyond the commodity sphere. Before it was privatised, the crown corpora- 
tion Teleglobe promoted Canada's national goals in international telecom- 
munications. As Babe (1990) has shown, when the private company Bell 
Canada did not believe that it could profit by providing telephone service to the 
three prairie provinces, provincial crown corporations were established to serve 
the region and, to this day, provide arguably the least expensive and most 
universally accessible telephone service on the continent. 
The FTA, in addition to making the commodity the accepted definition of 
culture, redefines the crown corporation, Canada's traditionally accepted means 
to pursue public policy goals. Canadians who benefited from national crown 
corporations now face monopolies whose activities must be constrained. These 
specific constraints are described below. What is important to understand here is 
that once again we can observe the cultural significance of the free trade deal. 
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The very language of the agreement re-constitutes the Canada-U.S. 
relationship by, among other things, identifying the preeminence of the com- 
mercial rights of international business, redefining culture as a marketable com- 
modity, and redefining an instrument of public policy, the crown corporation, to 
be a monopoly, which, by definition, restricts the free trade goals of the agree- 
ment. 
FREE TRADE, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, 
AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 
The foregoing offered evidence of the FTA's cultural significance. The follow- 
ing examines specific mechanisms of the deal that demonstrate the ways this 
cultural significance can be used to change communications policy in Canada. 
Moreover, the agreement serves as a template for a U.S. version of a global free 
wade regime in communication and information services. 
Cultural Industries and Equivalent Commercial Effect 
The trade agreement can affect Canadian culture in two fundamental ways. 
First, the agreement strengthens the conception of culture as a commercial com- 
modity. Moreover, as a commodity, culture is placed explicitly within the 
sphere of products open to retaliation against what a Party claims is unfair sub- 
sidization. Since the paper addressed the redefinition of culture earlier, this sec- 
tion turns to a discussion of the specific threat to cultural industries. 
Concretely, let us assume that this or some future federal government were 
to take steps to support the film industry, perhaps, as the government of Canada 
(1987~) has promised in the past, by asserting some national control over dis- 
tribution to improve opportunities for Canadian film makers. The agreement 
provides the U.S. with the treaty right to penalize Canada by imposing a duty on 
Canadian lumber or some other product "to equivalent commercial effect." 
Presumably, since there is no specific mechanism for determining that effect, 
the aggrieved Party would determine the specific dollar amount and announce 
its action. It would be up to the Party charged to protest the action, take it to the 
agreement's dispute settlement board, or deny the grievance and take its own 
counter measures. This is far from an unlikely prospect. In April, 1989 the U.S. 
charged that Canadian law and practice unfairly restricts foreign investment in 
the broadcasting and cable television industries (Ottawa Citizen, 29 April 1989). 
Moreover the U.S. Department of Commerce (1987: 7) is on record expecting 
changes in Canadian cultural policy. According to the FTA "Summary of 
Provisions" issued by the Department's Office of Canada: 
For its part, Canada has agreed that the U.S. can respond to actions 
taken by Canada that would be inconsistent with the FTA if cultural 
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industries were covered. This should encourage the adoption of non- 
discriminatory policies by Canada. 
For the U.S. Department of Commerce, "nondiscriminatory policies" are those 
that would eliminate Canadian government actions to develop national com- 
munication and cultural institutions. As de Kerckhove (1989: 21) notes, the 
White House was even stronger in its interpretation of the significance of the 
cultural industries component. In its statement of administrative action on the 
FTA, the White House warns that any attempt to 
legislate, proclaim, or take other action having the force in effect of 
law, either directly or indirectly, which impedes the production, dis- 
tribution, sale or exhibition of film, television programs, video record- 
ing would provoke U.S. trade retaliation. 
A May 1989 report of the Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and Intema- 
tional Studies is more specific. According to its author Wilson Dizard (1989: 
18), the long term US goal "is to modify or eliminate Canadian regulatory rules 
that require television stations to devote 60 per cent of their programming 
during the day,and 50 per cent in prime time, to Canadian material." Such 
retaliation is also not lost on the most ardent of free trade supporters. In a multi- 
page insert in The New York Times, paid for with mainly Canadian advertising, 
Richard Lipsey and Robert C. York (1989: 31) of the Canadian C.D. Howe In- 
stitute try to put the best face on the cultural industries provisions: 
Canada can thus continue to adopt, as it has in the past, policies to sup- 
port domestic producers at the expense of U.S. firms. The United 
States retains its present right to retaliate against such policies, but only 
to equivalent commercial effect. 
The last statement is at best a euphemism. There is considerable disagreement 
over whether the U.S. has the right to retaliate against Canadian support for its 
culture. The trade agreement is restrictive, as the U.S. Commerce Department 
report correctly notes, because for the first time the U.S. has the power of a 
treaty to back its claim to the right of retaliation against Canadian attempts to 
preserve and build on its national culture. 
In addition to diminishing Canada's ability to protect culture, there are 
other provisions of the agreement that, though less significant, suggest that the 
cultural "exemption" is more of a rhetorical device than a policy guideline. 
These include Canadian agreement to provide copyright law protection for 
retransmission of American copyrighted programming. This means for example, 
that Canadian cable companies will have to pay copyright holders for the use of 
any signals that they transmit. According to the White House's justification of 
the deal to Congress (1988: 40): 
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The regime the FTA obligates Canada to establish will provide sub- 
stantially the same protection in Canada which is now available under 
our laws. If the programs are rebroadcast simultaneously and without 
alteration, the copyright holder will receive equitable remuneration. If 
the program is altered or delayed, however, the cable operator must ob- 
tain the authorization of the program owner before showing it. In ef- 
fect, this means that the cable operator must negotiate a contractual 
agreement with the program owner. These improvements could result 
in gains of $20 million annually. 
A study released in September 1989 estimates that this could add $1.85 to the 
average monthly bill of an Ottawa cable subscriber, an increase of over 10 per 
cent (The Ottawa Citizen, 12 September 1989). Furthermore, Canada agreed to 
eliminate postal rate differentials for U.S. publications with a significant 
Canadian circulation and to end the requirement that prohibited advertising 
companies from taking an income tax deduction for expenses incurred on 
material not printed in Canada. Additionally, both parties agreed to eliminate 
tariffs on printed matter and recordings. 
As Parker (1988) has noted, the copyright provisions are especially sig- 
nificant because they mesh with provisions of the 1988 Canadian Copyright Act 
to establish reciprocity in cultural production. Since Canada imports far more 
than it exports in the cultural sphere, this means a substantial increase in the 
payments from the Canadian cultural sector to foreign producers. He cites 
Babe's estimates of a $100 million net outflow. As a result, Parker concludes, 
though the Copyright Act revisions claim to increase the flow of resources to 
Canadian cultural creators, reciprocity provisions "make it quite probable that 
'free trade in culture' will actually shrink the size of the fund available for 
Canadian creators and cultural production, and intensify Canadian dependence 
on foreign (mainly U.S.) production" (p.33). 
Communication Regulation and National Treatment 
The national treatment provision of the agreement requires that each country 
treat businesses of the other in the same way that it treats its own (Article 105 
and 1402). In the communications sphere this means that Canada's federal com- 
munication regulatory authority, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecom- 
munications Commission (CRTC) must treat AT&T, or some other 
non-Canadian fm doing business in Canada, in the same way that it treats Bell 
Canada. This change in the regulatory system is particularly significant in 
telecommunications, as the section below describes. 
Moreover, neither party is permitted to set rules regarding the "estab- 
lishment of a commercial presence" within the country as a prerequisite to 
providing a service. Consequently, national treatment must be offered to firms 
whose link to the country is purely electronic. As a result, Canadian service 
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workers will compete with Americans who are paid lower wages and receive 
fewer benefits, in part because American workers have lower rates of unioniza- 
tion. 
Canadian service workers will also have to compete more often with 
workers from Third World nations, whose low-wage labor U.S. companies use 
to process data and perform other low level information services. This provision 
is not lost on the analysts from the U.S. Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. As Dizard comments (1989: 14), the agreement "clearly permits the 
direct provision of computer services on both a network or a stand-alone basis. 
This is a potentially important point for cross-border activities of all of 
manufacturing and services sectors covered in the agreement." Concern about 
such a development has led to the formation of a coalition among Canadian, 
American, and Mexican groups who have budgeted over $170,000 over the next 
two years to assess the social consequences of a tri-lateral free trade arrange- 
ment described by the Canadian participant group, GATT-fly, as "part of a 
hemispheric strategy promoted by U.S. multinational business interests and 
their Canadian allies to integrate markets, gain free access to raw materials and 
energy inputs and pit worker against worker in a destructive competition for 
jobs. " (Diebel, 1989: A4) 
I Telecommunications and Enhanced Services 
I 
The national treatment provision takes on particular importance when it is ap- 
plied to the opening of free trade in "enhanced" telecommunications and infor- 
. mation services. 
Over the years governments have struggled with legal definitions of 
telecommunications services in order to make pricing, service, and access dis- 
tinctions. As Janisch (1989) notes, these have included distinctions among tech- 
nologies (is it primarily telephone or computing?) and among types of services 
(is it simply message transmission or does it incorporate message manipula- I 
tion?) According to Oettinger (1988), these are convenient fictions that facilitate 1 certain particular policy interests. 
I One distinction that many governments accept separates basic from en- hanced telecommunications services. Though policy makers and regulators dis- 
agree about precisely what constitutes a basic service, in general the category 
basic applies to the traditional use of the telephone to send and receive voice 
messages. An enhanced service is one, like electronic mail, in which a computer 
i intervenes to reconfigure the message (Canada, 1988). 
Like most distinctions made in this field, this one is difficult to establish in 
practice. All new telephone equipment contains microprocessors that recon- 
' figure messages to make transmission and switching more efficient. In practice, 
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Canadian regulators define basic services more broadly than do their U.S. 
counterparts. This is important because a provision of the agreement (Annex 
1404, Section C., Article 6) specifically exempts the provision of basic facilities 
and services. Consequently, basic telephone service, including local and long 
distance voice communication, is afforded some protection. 
Nevertheless, telephone networks are carrying an increasing amount of en- 
hanced services, such as data, video and other electronic information products. 
The government of Canada (1987b: 47) identifies enhanced services as the 
fastest growing telecommunications market in Canada, estimating annual ex- 
pansion at 63 per cent. This results from business demand for more services and 
the growing digitization of networks. The FTA explicitly opens free trade in en- 
hanced services (Annex 1408) and requires the CRTC to treat American com- 
panies, whether or not they set up offices in Canada, as if they were Canadian 
(Article 1402 (7)). Consequently, one can expect that U.S. companies, such as 
AT&T, will pursue the Canadian enhanced services market, cutting into the 
market share of Bell Canada and other Canadian telecommunications providers 
who look to that market for future growth. As a result, Canadian basic service 
providers plan to petition the CRTC for substantial rate increases to permit them 
to compete more effectively with American firms. The government of Canada 
(1987b: 55) acknowledges that "small business and residential subscribers 
might suffer" as a result of these pressures. Thus, competitive pressures "could 
have a major impact on the prices charged for local telephone services." Hence, 
in practice, the basic service exemption is likely to prove as weak as the cultural 
industries exemption. Canadian basic telephone subscribers will pay the price 
for this weakness. 
In addition to this, we are beginning to see evidence that the government of 
Canada supports broadening the definition of an enhanced service. Communica- 
tions Canada has promoted the case of one Canadian company, Call-Net, which 
claims that its minor addition to a basic service qualifies the company as an en- 
hanced service provider (Janisch, 1989). As a result, Call-Net, with the support 
of the federal ministry Communications Canada, argues that Be11 should be re- 
quired to lease it the lines necessary to provide service to its Toronto area cus- 
tomers. However, after three separate ministerial demands for reconsideration, 
the CRTC continues to maintain that Call-Net is trying to provide a basic ser- 
vice that is not permitted under Canadian regulation, where basic services are 
not opened to competitive entry. The specifics of this case are not as important 
as what it tells us about the Canadian government's intentions and about the 
link between regulation and the FTA. For if Call-Net or some similar company 
were permitted to offer a service such as Call Accounting or Call Identification 
under the enhanced designation, then the national treatment principle means that 
Canadian regulators must permit ATKzT, MCI or any of the U.S. regional 
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telephone companies (each of which is as large as Bell Canada) to offer the 
same service in Canada. 
In the latter part of 1989, the federal government took additional steps 
toward opening competition in the telecommunications market. Acting on a 
Supreme Court of Canada ruling, the federal government asserted regulatory 
jurisdiction over provincially regulated telephone systems. Several of these 
provincial jurisdictions, particularly those whose telephone systems are under 
provincial ownership, fearing local rate hikes, have balked at competitive entry. 
This action sends a clear signal that the federal government will not tolerate ob- 
jections to opening telecom markets. 
The federal government has also encouraged a major telecommunications 
firm, CNCP, to enter the long distance telecommunications market. This com- 
pany, once limited to the national telegraph business, has recently received a 
major boost from Ted Rogers, whose media empire includes cable television 
(the leading franchise holder in Canada), Cantel (one of two Canadian cellular 
phone systems), communications satellite and pay-per view television services. 
Rogers bought a 41 per cent share of the company and plans to promote its 
entry into telecommunications markets. Bell Canada has already predicted 
major local rate increases if CNCP-Rogers is permitted to enter the long dis- 
tance telecom market (Tasse, 1989). One can anticipate that such approval 
would also stimulate already strong interest from US telecom firms. 
Finally, the federal government has introduced legislation that would in- 
crease its control over the CRTC by giving the government the right to provide 
the CRTC with policy guidance in addition to its current power to ask the 
CRTC to reconsider regulatory decisions. According to the new Chair of the 
CRTC, this legislation will mean that "We will be the monkey and the govern- 
ment will be the organ grinder. So why bother with the monkey when you can 
go directly to the organ grinder?" (Winsor, 1989: A5) Concretely, this would 
help ensure that the regulator, which overturned a CNCP bid to compete in 
1985, would enjoy less freedom to oppose the government's pro-competitive, 
pro-trade policies. 
Crown Corporations and National Policy 
FTA controls on the operation of crown corporations limit Canada's ability to 
respond to the expansion of American telecommunications firms across the bor- 
der. The cultural section of this paper noted the semantic shift that the FTA 
produced in this area. Canada's crown corporations have become monopolies. 
In addition to this act of renaming, the FTA restricts a nation's power to use 
these organizations, whether private or public, for national development. Article 
2012 provides a broad definition of monopoly: "any entity, including any 
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consortium, that, in any relevant market in the territory of a Party, is the sole 
provider of a good or a covered service." 
The provisions governing monopolies begin, as do the provisions on cul- 
tural industries and telecommunications services, with the appearance of a gain 
for Canada. Recall how the FTA appears to exempt, but in practice does not, 
cultural industries and basic telecommunications services. Similarly, Article 
2010 states that "nothing in this Agreement shall prevent a Party from maintain- 
ing or designating a monopoly." This is followed by what amounts to a set of 
restrictions so severe as to make it unlikely that Canada will establish crown 
cwporations in the future. Article 2010 (2) stipulates that before designating a 
monopoly, a Party must notify and consult with the other and provide assuran- 
ces that the monopoly will not impair the agreement by doing what are essen- 
tially all the things that governments create monopolies to do. The monopoly is 
forbidden from operating in such a fashion that permits it to be anticompetitive, 
nationalistic, or to subsidize one of its services, like first class mail, basic 
telephone, or basic cable television services, out of revenues from other services 
(Article 2010 (3)). In essence, one is permitted to establish a crown corporation 
provided that it does not behave like a crown corporation. Furthermore, since 
such a measure would be the equivalent of a direct or indirect nationalization, 
Article 1605 stipulates that the Party establishing a "public monopoly" would 
be required to pay "'prompt, adequate and effective compensation at fair market 
value" to potential corporate or individual victims of the other Party. 
These provisions essentially preclude some future government from, for ex- 
amplt?, establishing a crown organization that would serve to promote the 
production and distribution of information services, or entertainment, such as 
feature films, because such an entity would, by definition, have to violate the 
treaty in order to meet its goals. This severely restricts the opportunity for a 
Canadian government, unless it chooses to risk the consequences of scrapping 
the treaty, to set a national policy in mass media and infomation that differs 
from or challenges, in any substantial fashion, the policy of the United States. 
TOWARD A TRANSNATIONAL INFORMATION ORDER 
If we call Third World policies in international communication an effort to build 
a New World Information Order, then the FTA is one among a number of steps 
toward the creation of a Transnational or "New" New World Information Order. 
Like many "new and improved" products in a world of advertising illusions, the 
"New" New Order presents little that is actually new. Rather, it deepens and ex- 
tends patterns of the Old Information Order for an electronic age. Concretely, 
changes in the communications stakes and players, help to explain the interest 
in this "Newn Order and also help to account for the FTA provisions in com- 
munication and culture. 
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Much of the literature on why Canada moved toward free trade with the 
United States concludes that the economic crisis of the seventies and early 
eighties led the government and business to conclude that such a policy was the 
only realistic alternative to long-term economic stagnation (Wamock, 1988; 
Westell, 1984). The near economic depression of the early years of this decade 
convinced policy makers that Canadian economic growth required stronger 
trading ties with the United States, particularly because the U.S. led the world in 
the production and distribution of what many believed to be the key resource of 
future growth: information. As the government of Canada has noted (1987b). 
many analysts argue that information and related service sectors are rapidly 
replacing their industrial counterparts and that nations need to master their in- 
formation resources in order to establish or maintain a strong position in the 
global econom y. 
The stakes in information have grown as business and government recog- 
nize that information is a direct source of capital accumulation because it is a 
profitable commodity (Schiller, 1988). Moreover, information systems are in- 
direct sources of accumulation because they serve as instruments of managerial 
control necessary to build and operate global systems of production, distribu- 
tion, and consumption (Robins and Webster,l988). The drive to turn resources, 
including information, into profitable commodities, and instruments of control, 
has historically been central to the development of capitalism. However, the ex- 
tension of this process to the information area was limited by technical and 
political forces. 
Technical constraints limited the ability to measure what constitutes an in- 
formation product and to monitor information transactions. Political resistance 
was constituted in public opposition to encroachments on universality built into 
the entitlement notion of information as a public good. The technical obstacles 
are being overcome with the development of digital technology which applies a 
common code to measure information and monitor its use efficiently and effec- 
tively. Moreover, the global integration of processing, distribution and display 
technologies makes it possible to connect and thereby control business opera- 
tions globally and locally. Such control extends to effective command of inter- 
national markets in finance, labor, raw materials, and consumers (Mosco, 1989). 
As Daniel Be11 (1989: 167) puts it: 
The old distinctions in communication between telephone (voice), 
television (image), computer (data), and text (facsimile) have been 
broken down, physically interconnected by digtal switching, and made 
compatible as a single unified set of teletransmissions. 
Public opposition is increasingly overcome by the pressures of large busi- 
ness and government information users who have become active players in in- 
ternational and domestic policy debates in order to meet their needs for 
58 Toward a Transnational World Information OrderN. Mosco 
cost-effective networks. As new players have succeeded in reorganizing a 
policy process that was traditionally structured to support the needs of large ser- 
vice providers, such as telephone companies (with a guaranteed annual return 
on capital), their unionized employees (with well-paid, secure jobs), and 
residential subscribers (with low-cost, universal service). As information has 
gone from being an incidental cost of doing business to a strategic source of 
profit and control, large users have promoted such policies as deregulation, 
privatization, and free trade (Schiller, 1981; Mosco, 1989). In Canada, they 
have done so through individual businesses such as the Royal Bank. More fre- 
quently, the interests of multinational users are given focus and force through 
the work of such lobbying groups as the Canadian Business Telecommunica- 
tions Association and the Information Technology Association of Canada. 
As a text, the FTA both reflects and constitutes the needs of these transna- 
tional players. Politically, the Canadian Government is particularly dependent 
on FTA provisions in the communications sector because its efforts to meet the 
needs of large users through domestic policy changes have encountered consid- 
erable opposition, particularly to deregulatory efforts in the telecommunications 
sector. The FTA, with all the power and legitimacy of a bilateral treaty, is an 
inportant instrument to realize deregulatory goals and foreclose nationalist al- 
ternatives that would include explicit efforts to promote the values of univer- 
sality, access, and Canadian control over this nation's communications industry. 
Both Canadian (Janisch, 1989) and U.S. (Dizard, 1989) supporters of the agree- 
ment recognize this and applaud it as a major accomplishment. As Dizard 
(1989: 5) puts it, the deal "implies a commitment that current restrictions on 
both sides of the border will not be expanded." These "restrictions" would in- 
clude low cost universal telephone service, Canadian broadcast content regula- 
tions, government support for film production and distribution, and rules that 
insist on national processing of banking and other sensitive data. 
TWO APPROACHES TO FORGE A GLOBAL ECONOMY 
The FTA is the first trade agreement in history that extends traditional free trade 
in goods to the service and investment sectors. This is particularly significant 
because, as a 1989 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( G A V  report 
concludes (Greenspon, 1989) service industries are taking up an increasing 
share of world trade. According to the study, total trade in services reached 
$560 billion in 1988, equaling the combined total of trade in food and fuel. Ser- 
vices such as banking, telecommunications, management consulting, and ac- 
counting make up 40 per cent of total world trade. With 11.2 per cent of world 
services exports, the United States leads the world. The FTA is particularly sig- 
nificant for the United States because it serves as a model to the ninety-six 
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nation GATT membership that has been debating the issue of trade in services. 
According to Dizard (1989: 5): 
Having established a bilateral framework for free trade, the Americans 
and Canadians should be in a stronger position to tackle complex 
trade-in-services negotiations in the Uruguay Round. 
It is hard to understand how Canada would be in a "better position." For it has 
just agreed to eliminate most opportunities to manage its own trade in services 
by concluding an agreement with the world's leading exporter of services. 
Moreover, Canada ventures into this new economic temtory without setting 
up a supranational political body that would address the wider, social, political, 
and cultural problems that can result from an agreement of this significance. 
Such problems are left with the diminished powers of national states and the en- 
hanced powers of the markets and the multinational f i i s  that manage them. 
Though Canada sought some form of binational governmental protection, the 
U.S. balked. As a result, the FTA provides for a binational panel to determine 
only if existing (mainly U.S.) trade laws are applied correctly. 
In contrast to the North American FTA, the European Economic Com- 
munity has taken a different approach, albeit within the framework of a market 
model. Owing in part to the greater parity of its members, the EEC is estab- 
lishing a "social charter" as well as an economic union. Such a continental 
charter is to provide some protection for public institutions, including public 
education, social welfare, occupational health and safety, and national culture 
(Greenhouse, 1989). Indeed, it is particularly ironic for Canadians to observe 
the EEC proposing to institute quotas on media imports that are strikingly 
similar to those pioneered by Canadian policy-makers in the pre-FTA era. For 1 
example, to regulate the flow of U.S.-made television programs, which reached 
$1 billion (US) in 1989, the EEC proposes to limit future imports to 50 per cent 
of all programming on European TV and supplement this with restrictions on 
the amount and type of advertising sponsorship, a regulation that would curtail 
U.S. ad penetration (Greenhouse, 1989). 
As Canadians can well understand, there is no guarantee that EEC controls 
will improve the quality of European television. Though a leading West Ger- 
man television executive sees this as "a combat for our own culture," the direc- 
tor of the European Institute for the Media worries that "there is a danger that 
the European rubbish will be no better than the American rubbish" (Green- 
house, 1989). These debates will undoubtedly persist beyond 1992. The inter- 
esting point from a contemporary policy perspective is that the package of 
EEC-wide regulations, what is increasingly called "the social charter," repre- 
sents an alternative model to the FTA for organizing the global information 
economy. As Kuttner (1989: 18) concludes: 
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To the extent that the U.S.-Canada Free Trade area impinges on 
Canadian sovereignty, it cedes political sovereignty to market forces. 
The EC, in sharp contrast, doesn't cede sovereignty to the market so 
much as elevate sovereignty to a supranational body-and one that 
happens to believe in industrial policies, trade unionism, a welfare 
state, and other elements of a 1940s-style mixed economy. 
Kuttner puts his finger on what North American supporters of the FTA fear 
when they use terms such as "Fortress Europe" or "creating new barriers." As 
Crawford has expressed it (1988), they are concerned about the development of 
even the most minimal of a social democratic alternative to a world information 
order forged and managed by transnational business. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper demonstrates that the Free Trade Agreement is a significant docu- 
ment for students of communication and culture. The agreement marks a shift in 
Canadian political culture by providing the first treaty legitimation of issues that 
are part of the contested terrain of Canadian life. The "Objectives and Scope" 
section mounts a Bill of Rights for Transnational Business against those who 
would contend that the national public sphere should take precedence. The sec- 
tion on culture redefines it as a marketplace commodity against those who argue 
that it is a public good, an essential component of national democratic 
sovereignty. Finally, the Agreement accepts the American definition of a 
monopoly and thereby undercuts the power of those who defend the crown cor- 
poration as an instrument of national policy. 
In addition to its impact on Canadian political culture, the FTA mounts an 
offensive on the instruments of Canadian communications policy. The cultural 
industries section permits explicit economic retaliation against national policies ' 
that protect culture. The national treatment provision diminishes the power of 
Canadian regulators and policy makers to discriminate in favor of Canadian 
companies. The telecommunications provisions take a major step in promoting 
by treaty those deregulatory policies that widespread opposition has made it dif- 
ficult to achieve domcstically. 
The FTA makes it significantly more difficult for a future Canadian 
government to develop the national institutions to build a domestic communica- 
tion policy that might clash with the interests of transnational business. In es- 
sence, the rights of such businesses to pursue commerce and set social and 
public policy take precedence over the political rights of national citizens and 
their national governments. This marks a significant step toward creating a 
transnational or "new" new world information order. 
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